



THE DOG IN THE MANGER: 
DEFINING THE STATE'S ENTREPRENEURIAL ROLE IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
Carlos A. Patrón 
 
Peruvian sources of fresh water supply are abundant, yet Peruvians have the second 
lowest level of access to piped water and sewerage in South America. Only 72 percent 
of households have piped water (but don’t dare to drink it from the faucet) and only 
51 percent have access to sewerage. According to government figures, 40 percent of 
piped water is not billed because of leaks and unauthorized connections.1 Current 
estimates project that Peru needs to invest US$4.6 billion in infrastructure just to reach 
the levels of piped water and sewage of Colombia and Chile.2 Opposers to the 
privatization of the state-owned Peruvian water and sewage system (mainly the 
government enterprises’ labor unions and advocates for middle class consumers with 
access to piped water and sewerage) argue that water is a human right, not a 
commodity. Meanwhile, per each cubic meter of water that is delivered by tanker-
trucks, the less fortunate (about ten million of them) pay roughly ten times the amount 
charged by government enterprises to piped water users, as dengue-fever (a tropical 
disease) outbreaks have become common in the lower-income settlements located in 
the desert areas outside of Lima due to lack of sewerage. 
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University of Oxford. Professor of Law, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú and Universidad Peruana de Ciencias 
Aplicadas.  
Research for this paper was conducted during my residency as Visiting Professor of Law at the Levin College of 
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1 See Private Investment In Peru's Water Industry, The Economist (February 16th, 2006), at 36-38. 
2 Estimates by the Instituto Peruano de Economía. 
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The preceding example sets the stage for the question we wish to address in this 
paper: Is entrepreneurship an appropriate role for the State in Latin American Countries 
(“LAC”)?3 We contend that there is a solid theoretical and empirical basis to sustain 
that it is not. While there is a growing sector that opposes furthering privatization 
efforts carried out in the region over the past two decades, we argue that public 
perception is largely fuelled by shortcomings rooted in policy implementation 
mismanagement of past divestiture processes that does not invalidate the premises 
upon which privatization of state-owned enterprises (“SOE”) stands. It does, however, 
reveal the paramount importance of introducing policies to foster greater transparency 
and political accountability into the divestiture processes and to strengthen the 
regulatory and institutional framework under which privatized firms must endure, all 
of which will require greater civil community involvement and citizen oversight 
schemes, effective communication, profit-sharing, inclusive dialogue and consensus 
building with labor and other interest groups. 
 
The paper is organized in four sections. In Section I, we outline the main common 
characteristics of the political economy under which SOE emerged, developed and 
ultimately withered in Latin America, touching on the goals drafted to justify the 
State’s entrepreneurial role in the region, as well as the common features of SOE 
performance prior to 1982. In turn, in Section II we discuss the theoretical 
shortcomings of state ownership and sketch a rough assessment of the costs and 
reputed benefits of the expansion of SOE in the region. Section III is centered on the 
process embarked upon by most LAC over the last two decades to unravel the State’s 
entrepreneurial role, discussing its motivations, successes and shortcomings. In 
                                                 
3 In this paper, we use the term “entrepreneur” and its variations to refer to the individual who undertakes the 
activity of, and assumes the risks associated to, organizing the standard means of production (capital, labor, 
land) and coordinating production and distribution of goods and services demanded in the market. 
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Section IV, we conclude by briefly reflecting on the future of the public-private 
ownership debate in the region. 
 
I. The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of SOE in Latin America 
 
As was the case in other less developed parts of the world, SOE in Latin America arose 
and expanded as a result of a mix of political, economical and ideological reasons.4 In 
general terms, by the end of World War II, the support of the export-led growth model 
that had endured throughout Latin America in the previous decades had weakened 
and dwindled as a result of the consequences of the exposure to external shocks that 
had plagued LAC’s economies in the past.5 At the time, the growing consensus in the 
region concerning the need to move towards industrialization and a greater and more 
ubiquitous role of the State as a way to provide independence from unstable and 
undynamic traditional commodity exports, found theoretical support in the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (“ECLAC”) and its import-
substituting industrialization (“ISI”) development model,6 as well as domestic support 
from certain sectors of local business communities which were somewhat comfortable 
with expanding the government’s efforts to enlarge the industrial base.7  
 
                                                 
4 For a brief background on the emergence of SOE in less developed countries in general, see D. Andrew Smith 
and Micheal J. Trebilcock, State-owned Enterprises in Less Developed Countries: Privatization and Alternative 
Reform Strategies, 12 European Journal of Law and Economics 217 (2001), at 218-219. 
5 For further insights into the short-comings of the export-led growth model in Latin America, and into the 
causes and effects of international shocks during the first decades of the XX Century, see, generally: Rosemary 
Thorp, Progress, Poverty and Exclusion: An Economic History of Latin America in the 20th Century (IDB, 1998), 
at 97-125; Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Latin American Economies: 1929-1939, in Latin America Economy and 
Society Since 1930 65 (Leslie Bethell ed., Cambridge University Press, 1998), at 65-114; Victor Bulmer-Thomas, 
The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence (Cambridge University Press, 1994), at 155-193.  
6 For further insights into the development of ISI policies in Latin America and the role of ECLAC, see, 
generally: E.V.K. Fitzgerald, ECLAC and the Theory of Import Substituting Industrialization in Latin America, 
in An Economic History of Twentieth-Century Latin America, Volume 3: Industrialization and the State in Latin 
America 58 (Enrique Cardenas et. al., eds., Palgrave, 2000), at 58-97; Thorp, supra note 5, at 127-157; Bulmer-
Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 276-322.  
7 See: Thorp, supra note 5, at 134-137; Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 350-352. 
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In a nutshell, the ISI model advanced by ECLAC prescribed deliberate government 
promotion of inward-looking industrialization, setting up industries to produce goods 
for local consumption that were previously imported, ensuring the profitability of 
these industries by shielding them from competing imports through tariffs and other 
government controls. Industrialization, of course, required significant capital 
investments (both as finance and technology), something not readily available in the 
region.8  
 
On the financial investment front, typical LAC were characterized by low domestic 
savings rates and inadequate allocative efficiency in capital markets, lacking the 
institutions (e.g., stock exchanges and financial intermediaries) required to facilitate 
their development. In addition to these constraints, private capital investment in LAC 
usually suffered from other sources of market failure, in particular infrastructure and 
commercial bottlenecks.9 Accordingly, by and large, LAC were caught in low-level 
investment traps that translated into little or no chance of profitability for investment 
opportunities that would have been profitable in more developed countries.  
 
ECLAC theorists were aware of the region’s “structural ridgities” -a term that 
encompassed the market imperfections rooted in infrastructural deficiencies and other 
sources- and of the need of foreign capital flows to ease overcoming these obstacles.10 
In their original conception, such inflows were envisioned mainly coming from public 
                                                 
8 See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 281. 
9 As Smith and Trebilcock explain, “[i]n an underdeveloped economy, investments are often not successful unless they 
are coordinated with other investments, e.g., an investment in a manufacturing plant would not be successful without, 
among other things: the energy and human capital required to operate a plant, a retail sector to sell the manufactured 
products, transportation to carry the products to retailers, and the infrastructure necessary to facilitate transportation”. 
Smith and Trebilcock, supra note 4, at 219. 
10 See Thorp, supra note 5, at 133.  
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foreign money channeled through local governments, mostly from the US.11 
Notwithstanding, as new foreign public money began to flow primarily towards 
Europe and post war reconstruction instead, inward-looking LAC were forced to 
conceive new sources of investment. 12 
 
In this context of insufficient capital investment, one of the main motivations that 
spurred the development of SOE was the need to sustain accelerated industrialization 
programs embarked by LAC.13 Initially, public investment was largely geared towards 
social infrastructure (e.g., railways, energy, communications), since regulatory pricing 
policies favoring broad objectives (e.g., low rates for targeted productive sectors and 
for low-income population) effectively deterred private sector investment in these 
activities.14 In time, however, the entrepreneurial role of the State in LAC expanded 
well beyond the goal of increased capital investments in infrastructure,15 as SOE began 
to emerge in “strategic” intermediate goods sectors (e.g., steel),16 in the financial 
sector,17 in branches of industry that resulted to be too sensitive to be controlled by 
foreign companies (e.g., oil),18 and in sectors with high-productivity (e.g., mining).19 
The number and size of SOE grew substantially over the coming decades (it is 
                                                 
11 Foreign public money had largely poured into the region during WWII as the US attempted to secure wartime 
supplies, build alliances and develop new strategic resources. See Thorp, supra note 5, at 117-120. 
12 Among other actions, LAC began to revise their stance on foreign direct investment and adopt legislation to 
attract multinational corporations in certain industrial sectors (e.g., consumer goods manufacturing). See: 
Enrique Cardenas, José Antonio Ocampo and Rosemary Thorp, Introduction, in An Economic History of 
Twentieth-Century Latin America, Volume 3: Industrialization and the State in Latin America 1 (Enrique 
Cardenas et. al., eds., Palgrave, 2000), at 4-5; Thorp, supra note 5, at 133-134; Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 
5, at 281. 
13 See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 282. 
14 See Werner Baer, Changing Paradigms: Changing Interpretations of the Public Sector in Latin America’s 
Economies, 88 Public Choice 365 (1996), at 366. 
15 See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 353-358. 
16 Setting up large integrated steel mills was generally considered strategic in order to deepen the 
industrialization process. See: Baer, supra note 14, at 366; Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 355. 
17 Development banks and commercial banks were set up to compensate for the lack of stock exchanges and 
financial intermediaries required to sustain the industrialization process (e.g., CORPO in Chile and Nacional 
Financiera in Mexico). See: Baer, supra note 14, at 367. 
18 Nationalist concerns generally afforded motivations for creating SOE to exploit non-renewable resources (e.g., 
YPF in Argentina, Petrobras in Brazil, Pemex in México, PetroPerú in Perú, PDVSA in Venezuela, etc.). See: 
Baer, supra note 14, at 366; Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 355. 
19 See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 353. 
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estimated that by the end of the 1970s Brazil had established 654 SOE and that by 1982 
Mexico had established 1,115 SOE).20 
 
As the entrepreneurial role of the State expanded throughout Latin America, so did 
the goals sketched to justify greater intervention, granted though that some SOE were 
just too hard to justify (e.g., SOE in tourism or nightclubs).21 Some justifications were 
economic in nature, such as the control of inflation, others were influenced by socialist 
and nationalist ideologies, such as income redistribution, employment generation and 
sovereign concerns. By and large, a common denominator to this variety of goals was 
the absence of profitability-based motivations. More often than not, however, such 
arguments simply concealed political motives pursued by populist and authoritarian 
governments that sought to secure income from highly productive activities, 
concentrate power or employ SOE for other self-interested purposes.22  
 
Despite no shortage of numerous socially profitable investment opportunities, the 
profitability of SOE in LAC was often limited as a result of financial restraints, price 
controls, spiraling costs and reinvestment restrictions.23 Notwithstanding, the inward-
development model attached particular importance to the rate of public investment 
and capital accumulation by the State, which was considered essential for sustaining 
high rates of private investment (crowding-in effect).24 Accordingly, despite their 
                                                 
20 See: Baer, supra note 14, at 367; Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 356. 
21 See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 356. 
22 See, for example: Paulo Rabello de Castro and Marcio Ronci, Sixty Years of Populism in Brazil, in The 
Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America 151 (R. Dornbusch and S. Edwards, eds., The University of 
Chicago Press, 1991), at 157 [explaining the intersection of populism and economics and the use of SOE to 
promote the centralization of economic power in Brazil under the Vargas administration]; Felipe Larraín and 
Patricio Meller, The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience, in The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin 
America 175 (R. Dornbusch and S. Edwards, eds., The University of Chicago Press, 1991), at 192-194 [explaining 
the management problems in nationalized industries in Chile under Allende that did not submit to authentic 
social decisions]. 
23 See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 357-358. 
24 See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 352. 
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modest contributions to GDP,25 SOE in LAC typically received a particularly 
disproportionate amount of domestic investment,26 increasing the cost of capital for 
private enterprises and “crowding-out” socially profitable private investment 
opportunities,27 a problem that in turn was typically compensated for through the 
expansion of SOE.28 While the importance of SOE in the process of capital 
accumulation expanded, contributions of SOE to gross fixed investment tended to 
exceed its contributions to net output in LAC, and the share of SOE in capital spending 
resulted far higher in LAC than in other less developed countries (and even higher 
than in developed countries).29 Moreover, in a context of weak domestic capital 
markets and limited availability of foreign sources of credit, employing SOE to finance 
investments and subsidize industrialization implied relying heavily on Governments 
running current account deficits and later, when inflationary consequences emerged, 
cutting resources from other social expenditures.30  
 
By the 1960s, the inward-development model wide spread throughout LAC had 
seemed to reach a dead end. As a result of the model’s inherent contradictions, 
inward-looking countries were soon characterized by the vicious interaction between 
balance-of-payments constraints, budget deficits and supply-side bottlenecks, which 
                                                 
25 Excluding Venezuela, average LAC SOE’s contribution to GDP was lower than the average for developing 
countries and for developed countries. See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 357. 
26 See: Thorp, supra note 5, at 161; Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 357. 
27 By the late 1970s, the weighted average for LAC share of SOE in gross domestic investment was 29 percent, 
compared to 7 percent in the U.S., 11 percent in Japan and 17 percent in the U.K. See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), 
supra note 5, at 357 note 120. 
In an extreme example, in Venezuela, the participation of public investment in total investment increased from 
24 percent in 1970 to 67 percent in 1982, and of the latter figure 81 percent was channeled through non-financial 
SOE. See Pablo Astorga, Industrialization in Venezuela, 1936-83: The Problem of Abundance, in An Economic 
History of Twentieth-Century Latin America, Volume 3: Industrialization and the State in Latin America 205 
(Enrique Cardenas et. al., eds., Palgrave, 2000), at 218.  
28 See, Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 352-353. 
29 Prior to the 1970s, country data (excluding Mexico) reveals that the share of public enterprises in total fixed 
investment was greatest in Bolivia (reaching 38 percent by 1968); followed by Brazil, Argentina, Chile and 
Venezuela (reaching 15 percent by the late 1960s); and by Colombia, Panama and Peru (between 6 to 10 percent 
at its highest levels). See Thorp, supra note 5, at 161. 
30 See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 285-287. 
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translated into exchange-rate instability and inflationary pressures.31 A growing 
consensus regarding the need to implement (unpopular) stabilization policies and a 
gradual move towards a more outward-looking development model,32 was largely 
delayed by the unprecedented massive availability of international private lending at 
negative real interest rates that ensued after the 1973 OPEC oil four-fold price rise.33  
 
Faced with an over-supply of cheap (unconditioned) foreign funds and encouraged by 
optimistic commodity price forecasts, most LAC did not hesitate to heavily borrow to 
sustain new high-levels of public investment to reactivate their growth momentum.34 
Large SOE in LAC became the favored clients,35 and the share of SOE in public 
expenditure typically rose.36 The quality of public spending, however, worsened (e.g., 
poorly-conceived, excessively capital-intensive projects and insufficient long-term 
export promotion), as did the quality of management and financial control of SOE 
(e.g., foreign funding allowed for new possibilities of associated commissions and 
corruption, resulting in expanded SOE expenditure).37 
 
                                                 
31 In a nutshell, lack of international competition and the small size of the domestic markets, coupled with the 
ensuing structure of production, dominated by monopolies and oligopolies, had resulted in high unit costs and 
elevated domestic prices. The model’s bias in favor of inward-led growth negatively affected the primary export 
sector and high production costs of manufactured goods further limited export activities, resulting in rigid 
dependency upon intermediate and capital goods that still needed to be imported to facilitate industrial activity. 
On the whole, the terms of trade deteriorated, as the lack of dynamism of the traditional export sector was not 
compensated by greater industrial exports, thus resulting in constant balance-of-payments difficulties. 
Furthermore, limited access to domestic and international finance, and the expansive role of the State, had 
translated into Government deficits, with inflationary consequences. See, generally, Bulmer-Thomas (1994), 
supra note 5, at 283-288. 
32 See, generally, Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 323-350. 
33 See, generally: Thorp, supra note 5, at 201-216; Ricardo French-Davis, Latin American Economies: 1950-1990, 
in Latin America Economy and Society Since 1930 149 (Leslie Bethell ed., Cambridge University Press, 1998), at 
171-175; Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 358-365. 
34 See Thorp, supra note 5, at 209.  
35 See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 358. 
36 See Thorp, supra note 5, at 209. 
37 See Thorp, supra note 5, at 207-214. 
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Increased public expenditure led to mounting government deficits -even in oil 
producing countries benefited by record prices-,38 which were financed by further 
borrowing. Between 1975 to 1982, the total public, private and short-term external debt 
of LAC’s rose from US$ 75.4 billion to US$ 314.4 billion, while LAC’s ratio of service 
payments to exports increased from 26.6% to 59% in the same period.39 
 
Inevitably, in time, the value of exports began to decline,40 resulting in a decrease in 
lending and deteriorating terms of trade. International capital flows to LAC and SOE 
were finally halted after the 1982 Mexican moratorium of its external debt. Having 
been cut-off from their source of deficit financing, by the mid 1980s, SOE were 
incurring in major losses that imposed heavy burdens on public accounts (e.g., by the 
second half of the decade, SOE annual losses in Peru amounted to 4.3 percent of GDP, 
representing 40 percent of total public sector deficit),41 fuelled inflationary pressures 
and resulted in extremely poor provisions of services.42 The debt crisis set in motion a 
chain of events that effectively brought an end to the old growth model based on the 
State’s central role in the process of capital accumulation, thus signaling the demise of 
the entrepreneurial role of the State in Latin America. 
 
II. Theoretical Framework of SOE Failure 
 
2.1 The Property Rights Model 
 
                                                 
38 See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 363-364. 
39 See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 363. 
40 Commodity prices fell as a result of the recession spurred by the strict monetary policies adopted by 
developed countries after the 1978 oil crisis. 
41 See: Carlos Otero Bonicelli, Perú: Gestión del Estado en el Período 1990-2000, Serie Gestión Pública 14 
(Instituto Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Planificación Económica y Social – ILPES, 2001), at 17; Rosendo 
Paliza, Impacto de las Privatizaciones en Perú, Revista Estudios Económicos 9 (July, 1999), at 18. 
42 See Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair to Hope (Oxford University Press, 
1995) at 173. 
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Contemporary theory of the firm and public choice theory, building upon classic property 
rights analysis, give us valuable conceptual insights required to understand the 
inherent risks associated to State control of entrepreneurial vehicles.  
 
Theory of the Firm 
 
Conventional theory of the firm analyses the efficacy of alternative ownership structures 
-basically owner-controlled private firms and managerially-controlled private firms- in 
terms of management incentives, monitoring incentives and monitoring abilities. 43 
The basic line of reasoning is that in a structure in which there is no separation 
between the management and the ownership of a firm, the owner-manager will make 
operating decisions which optimize his utility, since all the benefits (efficiency gains) 
of his decisions will accrue upon him. In turn, in a modern corporation (hereinafter 
referred to, simply as a “corporation”), in which ownership and management are 
typically separated, since the efficiency gains will tend to flow to the owners 
(shareholders) rather than to the managers, the latter have fewer incentives to operate 
the firm efficiently (or, in other words, may be encouraged to incur in utility-
maximizing behaviors in detriment of firm efficiency).  
 
In a private corporation, the divergence of shareholders’ and managers’ interests, that 
translate into reduced managerial incentives to operate efficiently, are somewhat 
attenuated (but not eliminated) by markets.44 For instance, the takeover market (the 
market for corporate control) and the ensuing risk of raiders obtaining control and 
                                                 
43 See, generally: Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 267 
(1988); Micheal C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 (1976). For a classic symposium review, see 
“Corporations and Private Property”, 26 Journal of Law and Economics 235 (1983). 
44 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard 
University Press, 1991) at 91. 
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appointing new management, may deter managerial inefficiency;45 the labor market, 
and its potential to reward proven management skills, may act as incentive for 
managers to perform; and, competition in product markets may create incentives by 
threatening managers of inefficient firms with diminished market shares and, at the 
limit, by punishing inefficient management with ensuing bankruptcy and 
unemployment.  
 
In addition to market incentives, deficient managerial performance can be 
counteracted by shareholder action (e.g., positive reinforcement, such as linking 
compensation to performance or granting stock-option plans that align managers 
utility more closer to that of the shareholders; or deterrence through punishment, such 
as managerial replacement),46 provided that the latter have sufficient incentives to 
monitor management.47 The basic concept is that shareholders will monitor the 
activities of management so long as the expected returns from monitoring activities 
exceed the opportunity costs involved (e.g., time and resources spent on monitoring). 
Typically, this occurs in cases of concentrated ownership (e.g., a majority or 
controlling shareholder) or when institutional investors are present, in which cases the 
size and importance of the returns of the investments involved warrant incurring in 
monitoring activities. Alternatively, in corporations in which ownership is very 
diffused, corporate governance regulations (e.g., the existence of independent 
Directors) will tend to compensate for reduced monitoring incentives. 
 
                                                 
45 See, generally: Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 44, at 109-144; Henry G. Maine, Mergers and the Market 
for Corporate Control, 73 The Journal of Political Economy 110 (1965). 
46 See Anne T. Coughlan and Ronald M. Schmidt, Executive Compensation, Management Turnover, and Firm 
Performance: An Empirical Investigation, 7 Journal of Accounting and Economics 43 (1985). 
47 See, generally, Jensen and Meckling, supra note 43. 
 12
Finally, in order for monitoring activities to be effective, shareholders require to have 
the abilities to perform this task. In this respect, a central issue is the potential of 
information asymmetries to hinder a shareholder’s ability to monitor management 
performance. Notwithstanding, in private corporations, diffused ownership has the 
effect of permitting greater specialization among shareholders (allowing for 
comparative advantages in ownership), thus facilitating sooner and more accurate 
responses in the event of inefficient management decisions.48 In addition, private 
corporation are required to periodically disclose information on performance (e.g., 
independent auditor reports) and stock market prices (and market analysts), albeit not 
perfect, also provide an index of firm performance which may induce management to 
perform well to keep share prices high and enable shareholders to fairly quickly adopt 
corrective actions (e.g., voting “with their feet”, selling stock that underperforms).49  
 
Public Choice Theory 
 
Public choice theory, somewhat mirroring the theoretical framework reviewed above, 
takes us one step further to expose the innate problems of publicly or state-owned 
firms. The debate over whether or not State ownership of firms affects performance 
can be traced back to Alchian’s theoretical prediction that publicly owned firms (SOE) 
will be inherently less efficient than private firms.50 The core of this conjecture rests 
upon the proposition that “the differences between public and private ownership arise from 
the inability of a public owner to sell his share of public ownership”.51 As De Alessi 
summarizes, “[s]ince this rules out specialization in their ownership, it inhibits capitalization 
                                                 
48 See Louis De Alessi, Private Property and Dispersion of Ownership in Large Corporations, 28 The Journal of 
Finance 839 (1973), at 842-843. 
49 See Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 44, at 96-97. 
50 See A.A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, in Economic Forces at Work 127 (Liberty Fund, 1977). 
[Reproduced from: A.A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 IL Politico 816 (1965).]  
51 Alchian, supra note 50, at 138. 
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of future consequences into current transfer prices and reduces owners’ incentives to monitor 
managerial behavior”.52 In parallel, conventional public choice theory, modeled around 
the paradigm of the self-interested bureaucracy,53 predicts that in the context of 
reduced monitoring activities, SOE managers will maximize their pay, power and 
prestige in detriment of firm efficiency.  
 
Within this framework, management incentives, monitoring incentives and 
monitoring abilities discussed above, will typically be less effective in a public 
corporation (SOE) than in a private corporation. Markets, for instance, will tend to be 
less effective in promoting management performance in public enterprises. Since 
shares of public corporations can not be sold, SOE are in fact excluded from the 
market for corporate control (takeovers do not pose a threat);54 in contrast to the 
private sector market for managers, which will likely be driven by efficiency 
consideration,55 managerial appointments in SOE are usually driven by political 
motivations, hence reducing the labor market’s impact on managerial performance;56 
and since governments seldom permit SOE to go bankrupt (and incur in the political 
cost of laying-off the SOE workforce), opting instead to subsidize loss-making firms 
                                                 
52 Louis De Alessi, The Economics of Property Rights: A Review of the Evidence, in 2 Research in Law and 
Economics: A Research Annual 1 (R. Zerbe ed., 1980), at 27-28. 
53 For a brief overview of conventional public choice theory and its postulates, see Nicholas Mercuro and Steven 
G. Medema, Economics and the Law: From Posner to Post-Modernism (Princeton University Press, 1997), at 85-
97. 
54 As Vining and Boardman explain, “[t]he only way the political market could directly replicate the market for 
corporate control is by imitating the takeover process, i.e., by threatening privatization.” However, this is usually not a 
credible threat. [Aidan R. Vining and Anthony E. Boardman, Ownership Versus Competition: Efficiency in 
Public Enterprise, 73 Public Choice 205 (1992), at 212.]  
55 See Coughlan and Schmidt, supra note 46.  
56 See: Smith and Trebilcock, supra note 4, at 220; Vining and Boardman, supra note 54, at 212-213.  
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given their incentives to use SOE to pursue political goals,57 public firm managers 
have reduced incentives to improve efficiency or avoid unprofitable decisions.58  
 
In turn, monitoring incentives in SOE are poor. This predictable result derives directly 
from Alchian’s seminal proposition.59 An SOE belongs to the State, therefore, in a 
sense, it belongs to all citizens collectively but to no citizen in particular. In other 
words, “ownership” in an SOE is much more diffused than it could ever be even in the 
largest of private corporations. Moreover, since a citizen cannot sell his participation 
(e.g., shares) in an SOE, the diminished returns from mismanagement (or, 
alternatively, the increased efficiency gains from performance enhancing decisions) 
will not accrue upon any individual citizen in particular but, instead, will be diluted 
among the collective. Accordingly, as Smith and Trebilcock point out, “the returns to 
any one citizen as a result of monitoring [in order to determine the sources of SOE 
inefficiencies and attempt to correct them] would never be greater than the opportunity cost of 
the time invested in such activities”.60 Furthermore, alternative remedies to overcome this 
collective-action problem, such as corporate government regulations, will usually be 
absent, particularly in institutionally weak countries prone to the operation of SOE for 
political purposes.  
 
Finally, monitoring abilities in SOE are also hindered. This is partially a result of the 
collective-action problems discussed above: While, admittedly, information available 
for private corporation monitoring is not perfect, reduced monitoring activities in SOE 
                                                 
57 Stiglitz further argues that politicians rarely credibly commit to ending SOE subsidies. [Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Some Theoretical Aspects of the Privatization: Applications to Eastern Europe, in Privatization Processes in 
Eastern Europe: Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Results (Mario Baldassarri et. al., eds., Palgrave, 1993), 
at 179-204.] 
58 See Smith and Trebilcock, supra note 4, at 220. 
59 See Alchian, supra note 50. 
60 See Smith and Trebilcock, supra note 4, at 221. 
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translate into even scarcer performance information, resulting in greater management 
discretion and diminishing performance. In addition, as we have seen, since SOE tend 
to be justified on the grounds of non-productive goals, information disclosed to the 
public may be non-comparable and of little use to assess firm efficiency.61  
 
2.2 The Competition Factor 
 
A second source of inefficiency widely cited in the debates surrounding SOE, can be 
simply recapped as insufficient competition in SOE markets. The current growing 
consensus is that lack of competition and ownership structures are not mutually 
exclusive explanations of SOE failure,62 but rather are complementary in nature.63 
 
Commonly, government ownership tends to encourage monopolistic markets (or 
markets dominated by oligopolies). Governments in LAC, for instance, have in the 
past reserved certain sectors of the economy for SOE, barring private competition or 
                                                 
61 See Smith and Trebilcock, supra note 4, at 221. 
62 An extreme version of competition argument sustains that competition in product markets, and not whether a 
firm is publicly or privately owned, is the determinant factor of SOE inefficiency. The policy prescription that 
would naturally follow would be that introduction of competition in a given SOE market would largely 
eliminate the need to privatize. However, empirical studies have by and large refuted this hypothesis, 
evidencing that ownership does in fact matter and that SOE (and even mixed enterprises) perform substantially 
worse than similar private corporations in competitive environments. See, for example: Eytan Sheshinski and 
Luis F. López-Calva, Privatization and Its Benefits: Theory and Evidence, 49 CESifo Economic Studies 429 (2003) 
[concluding that microeconomic evidence overwhelmingly supports that publicly owned enterprises in 
competitive environments would not perform better than privately owned companies in the same 
circumstances in terms of profitability, and may perform worse]; Kathryn L. Dewenter and Paul H. Malatesta, 
State-Owned and Privately-Owned Firms: An Empirical Analysis of Profitability, Leverage and Labor Intensity, 
91 The American Economic Review 320 (2001) [concluding that government-owned firms are significantly less 
profitable than privately owned firms, that government firms are less efficient than private firms and that public 
firms tend to display greater labor intensity than private firms]; Anthony Boardman and Aidan R. Vining, 
Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, 
Mixed and State-owned Enterprises, 32 Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1989) [concluding that large industrial 
mixed enterprises and SOE perform substantially worse than similar private corporations; and that mixed 
enterprises perform better than SOE in terms of sales per employee, perform the same in terms of sales per 
assets, but often perform no better or worse than SOE in terms of profitability indicators]. 
63 See, generally: Sheshinski and López-Calva, supra note 62; Smith and Trebilcock, supra note 4, at 222-223; 
Dewenter and Malatesta, supra note 62; Vining and Boardman, supra note 54; John Vickers and George Yarrow, 
Economic Perspectives on Privatization, 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives 111 (1991); Boardman and Vining, 
supra note 62.  
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restricting its freedom to concur by way of massive regulatory legislation.64 In sectors 
of the economy in which private and public corporations concur, governments have a 
direct stake in protecting SOE, and are prone to subsidize or aid the latter, effectively 
crowding out the private sector.65 In Latin America, as previously discussed, the 
private sector was also crowded out as a result of the disproportionate amounts of 
domestic investment geared towards SOE, which increased the cost of capital for 
private investments.66 
 
Absent natural monopoly problems, competition fosters allocative efficiency by 
reducing a single firm’s ability to set prices at marginal cost of production and 
productive efficiency by encouraging cost reduction. It naturally follows that, absent 
effective competition, an SOE’s pricing and cost practices may tend to reduce social 
welfare. 
 
The problems derived from monopoly are, of course, not exclusive to SOE.67 Absent 
adequate regulation (e.g., antitrust legislation), private corporations may be motivated 
to maximize profits in detriment of social welfare. Likewise, certain industries, 
regardless of whether they are privately owned, are subject to natural monopoly 
problems (e.g., electricity transmission). Notwithstanding, these situations can be 
largely compensated by means of regulation. The costs of implementing and enforcing 
such regulations are not, conversely, sufficient reason to justify state-ownership of 
                                                 
64 See Edwards, supra note 42, at 173. 
65 See Smith and Trebilcock, supra note 4, at 222. 
66 Supra note 27. 
67 Granted that, in the heyday of SOE in LAC, insufficient competition was a quandary that plagued both SOE 
and private corporations (limiting competition was actually a central policy instrument). This fact, however, 
does not in itself justify the subsistence of SOE, but rather reveals the need to promote competition in both 
private and public markets.  
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these industries, given that such an argument would neglect the ownership-related 
inefficiencies detailed above.68  
 
2.3 Evidencing SOE Failure 
 
Empirical studies, both in developed and less developed countries, have by and large 
confirmed the propositions described above, evidencing that ownership structures do 
have a significant impact on firm performance (that is, that SOE perform substantially 
worse than similar private corporations in comparable environments) and that 
introducing market competition into potentially competitive markets dominated by 
SOE result in efficiency gains (for both private and public firms).69 LAC’s experience 
with SOE, and the most recent and comprehensive empirical studies on the 
privatizations carried out in Latin America over the past 20 years,70 which will be 
discussed in Section III below, further endorse these conclusions. 
 
How much have SOE cost LAC? The figures are staggering: In Peru alone, it is 
estimated that between 1968 and 2000, non-financial SOE accumulated losses (at 
current Dollar value) of approximately US$29.7 billion, a sum that exceeds by several 
billion Dollars the amount of investment required to close the country’s total 
infrastructure gap.71 As of 2005, accumulated losses of Peruvian non-financial SOE are 
estimated at US$34.2 billion (an amount that exceeds Peru’s current total public 
                                                 
68 Smith and Trebilcock, supra note 4, at 222. 
69 See, generally: Sheshinski and López-Calva, supra note 62; William L. Meggison and Jeffry M. Netter, From 
State to Market: A Survey of Empyrical Studies on Privatization, 39 Journal of Economic Literature, 321 (2001); 
Smith and Trebilcock, supra note 4; Dewenter and Malatesta, supra note 62; Vining and Boardman, supra note 
54; Vickers and Yarrow, supra note 63; Boardman and Vining, supra note 62. 
70 For the most recent and comprehensive data on the results of privatization in LAC, see: Alberto Chong and 
Florencio López-de-Silanes (Eds.), Privatization in Latin America: Myths and Reality (Stanford University Press, 
2005). 
71 According to estimates by the Instituto Peruano de Economía, Peru’s total infrastructure gap in transport (roads, 
airports, ports and rail), water and sanitation, energy and telecommunications is roughly US$24 billion. 
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external debt by 53%).72 Apart from financial losses and the general welfare 
consequences of reduced firm efficiency, poor SOE performance, of course, entails 
derivative social costs that should not be readily ignored. In LAC, for instance, the 
structures of production fostered by SOE, characterized by monopolies and 
oligopolies, along with other sources inefficiencies derived from inward-looking 
development policies, translated into high unit costs of production which negatively 
impacted the possibility of exporting manufacturing goods, deteriorating terms of 
trade and, ultimately, contributing to the balance-of-payments difficulties and 
exchange-rate instability that constantly troubled LAC during most of the latter half of 
the past century.73 In turn, in a context of reduced availability of capital, employing 
SOE to finance investments and subsidize industrialization implied relying heavily on 
Governments running current account deficits (with the inflationary consequences 
that are all too familiar to Latin Americans) and later, in light of emerging 
disequilibria, cutting resources from other useful social expenditures.74 Likewise, as 
previously discussed, despite their modest contributions to GDP, SOE in LAC 
typically received a particularly disproportionate amount of domestic investment,75 
increasing the cost of capital for private enterprises (crowding-out the private sector) 
and diverting resources from sectors of the economy in which they could be more 
productively employed.76 Sources estimate that the direct and indirect losses 
attributable to poor SOE performance in a typical less developed country range from 5 
to 8 percent of GDP and as high as 8 to 12 percent of GDP in less developed countries 
with a relatively large SOE sector.77 
                                                 
72 Estimates by the Instituto Peruano de Economía. 
73 See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 283-285. 
74 See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 285-287. 
75 See: Thorp, supra note 5, at 161; Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 357. 
76 See, Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 352. 
77 See Smith and Trebilcock, supra note 4, at 226, citing data from Russel Muir and Joseph P. Saba, Improving 
State Enterprise Performance: The Role of Internal and External Incentives (World Bank, 1995). 
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In all fairness, any assessment of the social costs that SOE may have represented to 
LAC would be biased if we did not try to account for the putative benefits (the 
potential positive social externalities) derived from the non-profitable goals SOE 
allegedly pursued. Notwithstanding, despite the scarcity of relevant data, it seems 
quite apparent that SOE in LAC have, on a whole, not accomplished the goals they 
allegedly pursued, nor delivered the social benefits they were meant to achieve. 
 
The most often cited goal to justify the creation of SOE in LAC is increased capital 
investment in infrastructure. The fact that, despite several improvement in basic 
infrastructure, by the 1980s most LAC were still caught in low-level investment traps, 
simply reveals the lack of success in developing and extending infrastructure through 
SOE.78  
 
LAC SOE’s record in achieving non-productive goals (mainly income distribution, 
employment generation and the control of inflation) is not much better. Most 
disturbingly, the existing data reveals that from the period between 1950 and 1990, 
income distribution, measured both in terms of the share of income received by the 
bottom quintile of the population and by Gini coefficient, actually worsened 
throughout Latin America.79 The generation of employment opportunities was one of 
the biggest disappointments of inward-industrialization, centered around capital 
                                                 
78 Comparative empirical data seems to hold true this conclusion in other less developed countries. See Smith 
and Trebilcock, supra note 4, at 226. 
79 After World War II, while other regions of the world experienced improvements in the share of income 
received by the bottom quintile of the population, LAC witness further declines (by 1970, the average for Latin 
America was 3.4% compared to 4.9% in all developing countries). See, Bulmer Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 
313. 
In terms of Gini coefficient (a rising Gini coefficient over time reflecting a worsening income distribution) 
existing data supports increases from 0.37 in Argentina in the early 1950s to 0.52 in 1990, from 0.57 in Brazil in 
1960 to 0.63 in 1990, from 0.44 in Chile in the early 1950s to 0.52 in 1978. Improvements are found in Mexico 
(from 0.61 in 1963 to 0.52 in 1989) and Colombia (from 0.51 in the early 1950s to 0.47 in 1988). See Thorp, supra 
note 5, at 352. 
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intensive activities that determined that the rate of growth of industrial production be 
much greater than the growth rate of employment in industry, which in turn, in light 
of a high rate of urbanization, incited the development of a massively underemployed 
urban informal sector.80 In respect to controlling inflation, it is not necessary to go into 
further details in light of the well-known consequences of expansive monetary policies 
to finance deficits and macroeconomic mismanagement that plagued Latin America 
during this time.81 
 
Finally, we cannot conclude this section without alluding to sovereign-related 
concerns that are often voiced to justify the state’s entrepreneurial role in Latin 
America. Without going into the philosophical merits, or lack thereof, of nationalistic 
ideologies, one can concede that public ownership may play to a society’s benefit 
when national security issues are at stake. However, it is disputable that sovereignty 
alone, a concept all too frequently invoked in the region, may serve to justify the 
State’s control of SOE to exploit non-renewable resources (or other industries) that 
serve no useful national security purposes, particularly in light of the track record of 
poor SOE performance in LAC.82 Latin American political history reveals that, more 
often than not, such arguments simply conceal political motives pursued by populist 
and authoritarian governments that seek to secure income from highly productive 
activities, concentrate power or employ SOE for other welfare reducing self-interested 
purposes.83 In countries battered by insufficient growth rates, income inequality and 
extreme poverty rates, supporting inefficient industries operated through SOE in 
                                                 
80 See: Benedict J. Clements, State Enterprises and Employment Generation in Brazil, 41 Economic Development 
and Cultural Change 51 (1992) [concluding with empirical data that SOE in Brazil resulted inferior to the private 
sector in generating jobs for the urban workforce]; Werner Baer, Industrialization in Latin America: Successes 
and Failures, 15 The Journal of Economic Education, 124 (1984), at 128-129. 
81 See, generally, Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (Eds.), The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin 
America (University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
82 See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 353-355. 
83 Supra note 22. 
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circumstances in which the potential social benefits are ambiguous, only diverts 
resources away from socially profitable investment and expenditure opportunities. 
 
III. The Success and Shortcomings of Latin American SOE Divestiture 
 
Mexico’s 1982 default on its international debt brought to a halt the massive flows of 
private commercial lending to Latin America that, coupled with soaring interest rates, 
a steady weakening of international commodity prices, and debt servicing that 
impinged heavily on national budgets, resulted in severe balance of payments and 
fiscal crisis.84 The gravity of the crisis afforded momentum to the adoption throughout 
the region of a more comprehensive version of the traditional orthodox monetarist 
approach to stabilization that had been widely advocated by the international 
monetary community since the late 1950s, that was coupled with structural reform 
prescriptions (in time, these policies were to be known as the “Washington 
Consensus”).85 Having proven their effectiveness at reducing budget deficits, reducing 
disequilibria and controlling inflation after the Bolivian hyperinflation crisis of 1985, 
even the more reluctant LAC, that had opted to experiment with heterodox 
micromanagement policies that only worsen their crisis (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and 
Peru),86 followed suit. 
 
                                                 
84 See: Thorp, supra note 5, at 217-218; Bulmer-Thomas (1994), supra note 5, at 366-369. 
85 See, generally, John Williamson (Ed.), Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Institute for 
International Economics, 1990). 
86 Although the implementation and management of heterodox policies in Argentina, Brazil and Peru varied 
somewhat, it is nonetheless possible to identify several common features. These experiments combined elements 
of traditional orthodox stabilization (for example, devaluation and price adjustments) with unorthodox 
elements designed to curtail inflationary expectations (for example, price, salary and exchange-rate freezes) and 
increase real tax revenue. For further information on heterodox policies, see: Thorp, supra note 5, at 224-225; 
Edwards, supra note 42, at 33-39; John Crabtree, Peru Under García: An Opportunity Lost (Macmillan, 1992); 
Ricardo Lago, The Illusion of Pursuing Redistribution Through Macropolicy: Peru’s Heterodox Experience 1985-
1990, in The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America 263 (R. Dornbusch and S. Edwards, eds., The 
University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
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The first generation Washington Consensus policies addressed the deeply rooted 
inherent deficiencies of the economic structures inherited from past State-led and debt-
led growth, resulting from the protective nature of its policies and the excessive role of 
the State, emphasizing the need to reform balance-of-payment policies (e.g., real 
exchange rates, trade liberalization and openness towards direct foreign investment), 
adopt strict fiscal policies (e.g., fiscal discipline and priority setting, tax reform), 
liberalize finance (e.g., capital markets) and promote a competitive environment (e.g., 
deregulation, property rights).87 In this context, SOE divestiture was seen as an 
essential all-purpose public policy -a way to overhaul the economic structures derived 
from the State’s ubiquitous role in economic activities, increase State revenues, reduce 
deficits from failing public firms, balance budgets, improve the efficiency and quality 
of public services, promote competition and attract foreign investment.88 Accordingly, 
throughout the 1990s, massive privatization programs were launched in most LAC,89 
the results of which are discussed below. 
 
3.1 The Economic Results of Latin American Divestiture 
 
It almost goes without saying that the implementation of privatization programs and 
other structural reform policies in Latin America have contributed to overcome the 
sources of macroeconomic instability that detonated the debt crisis of the 1980s. 
                                                 
87 See Thorp, supra note 5, at 226-231. 
88 See Edwards, supra note 42, at 174. 
89 In this paper, the term “divestiture” is used to refer to all forms of disposition or disposal of an SOE, including 
privatization, liquidation or other means; and the term “privatization” is used to refer to all forms of 
transferring SOE to the private sector, including the transfer of ownership, sale of productive assets, temporary 
transfers through concessions, etc.  
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Notwithstanding, skepticism concerning the microeconomic effects of privatization in 
Latin America still persists.90 
 
Individual cases of successful and botched privatizations in Latin America can be 
readily identified. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to draw general conclusions 
concerning the benefits (or lack thereof) of divestiture from such random examples, for 
we would be incurring in a sample selection bias. Much of the existing literature on 
firm performance after privatization in Latin America suffers from this and other 
sources of sample selection bias,91 or is otherwise flawed due to the use of non-
comparable data (e.g., meaningful comparisons between pre and post-privatization 
performance cannot be drawn when SOE are split-off prior to privatization or are 
merged after changes in ownership).92  
 
The most comprehensive studies on the performance of privatized SOE in the seven 
leading Latin American privatizing countries,93 conducted by a research-network 
supervised by Alberto Chong and Florencio López-de-Silanes, have recently been 
published and their results are outlined below. To overcome the obstacles detailed in 
the preceding paragraph, the researchers performed a painstakingly detailed 
collection of data, compiling extensive pre and post-privatization information for 
nearly complete cross-industry samples of privatized firms of all sizes, as well as 
                                                 
90 See, for example: David Mckenzie and Dilip Mookherjee, The Distributive Impact of Privatization in Latin 
America: Evidence from Four Countries, 3 Economía 161 (2003); K. Bayllis, Privatization and Poverty: The 
Distributional Impact of Utility Privatization, 73 Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 603 (2002); Nancy 
Birdsall and John Nellis, Winners and Losers: Assessing the Distributional Impact of Privatization, Working 
Paper Number 6 (Center for Global Development, 2002). 
91 See Alberto Chong and Florencio López-de-Silanes, The Truth About Privatization in Latin America, in 
Privatization in Latin America: Myths and Reality 1 (A. Chong and F. López-de-Silanes, eds., Stanford 
University Press, 2005), at 9-12. 
92 See Chong and López-de-Silanes, supra note 91, at 17-18. 
93 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
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detailed firm or plant-level audited accounting information, proxy financial 
information and other sources of information that allowed data aggregation.94  
 
Diverging from a growing trend in public perception throughout the region, the 
studies complied by Chong and López-de-Silanes indicate that the privatization of 
SOE carried out in the countries surveyed during the past two decades, has led to 
increased profitability resulting from improved operating efficiency supported by 
accelerated restructuring and productivity improvements (e.g., reductions in unit costs 
and increased output),95 and not at the expense of government revenues or from labor 
and consumer exploitation. On the contrary, these studies consistently point to 
increased tax revenues from privatized SOE.96 Likewise, these studies reveal important 
increases in real and industry-adjusted wages (between 70 to 110 percent) and 
immaterial median savings from reduced labor costs, thus refuting the hypothesis that 
a large source of productivity gains in privatized SOE is to be found in transfers from 
workers to private shareholders (e.g., resulting from fewer workers and lower 
wages).97 Finally, these country surveys bring to light that privatization of SOE have 
generally resulted in improved product and service quality (although much can still be 
done to improve access and distribution of public services and utilities),98 and that the 
median change in profitability of privatized firms in potentially noncompetitive 
industries is generally lower than that of privatized firms in competitive industries 
                                                 
94 See Chong and López-de-Silanes, supra note 91, at 6-18. 
95 According to theses studies, the median decline of cost per unit of privatized SOE in the countries surveyed 
fell 16 perfect, the median country sales-to asset ratio increased 16 percent, the median country workforce 
reduction was 24 percent and, despite modest investment and falling employment, the median firm output 
increased over 40 percent. Improvements in privatized SOE generally outpaced matching private firms, ruling 
out that gains could be attributed to changes in macroeconomic conditions, and the performance gap between 
privatized SOE and comparable private firms was significantly reduced. See Chong and López-de-Silanes, supra 
note 91, at 18-26. 
96 See Chong and López-de-Silanes, supra note 91, at 27-28. 
97 See Chong and López-de-Silanes, supra note 91, at 28-32. 
98 See Máximo Torero and Alberto Pascó-Font, El Impacto Social de la Privatización y Regulación de los 
Servicios Públicos en el Perú, Documento de Trabajo N° 5 (Grade, 2000). 
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(while the growth in investment, employment and output in the former have exceeded 
the growth achieved in the latter), hence casting a serious shadow of doubt over the 
often voiced proposition that post-privatization firm profitability may be a result of 
market power and consumer exploitation.99 
 
By and large, the empirical evidence outlined above confirms that changes in 
ownership structures implemented throughout Latin America over the past two 
decades have had a significant positive impact upon firm performance and social 
welfare. Individual instances of privatization failure, of course, can still be identified, 
although the aggregate data tends to reveal that the magnitude and severity of such 
failure does not necessarily coincide with the perceptions that fuel certain sectors of 
contemporary Latin American public opinion. The potential and actual sources of SOE 
privatization failure are delineated in the following section.  
 
3.2 Potential and Actual Sources of Divestiture Failure in Latin America 
 
For all its technical and economic explanations and achievements, privatization is also 
fundamentally a political process.100 As such, we cannot understate the fact that the 
effects of privatization may be underscored by the political economy in which it is 
carried out. Likewise, we cannot loose sight of the fact that privatization does not end 
the State’s involvement in the economy, but rather transforms it away from the role of 
directly producing goods and services toward the role of supervisor and regulator of 
the privatized companies in a competitive environment, a sometimes uncomfortable 
                                                 
99 See Chong and López-de-Silanes, supra note 91, at 32-39. 
100 See: W. Rand Smith, Privatization in Latin America: How Did It Work And What Difference Did It Make?, 44 
Latin American Politics and Society 153 (2002), at 155; William Megginson, Privatization, 118 Foreign Policy 14 
(2000), at 14; Luigi Manzetti, Privatization South American Style (Oxford University Press, 1999), at 1-3. 
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transition that if not adequately implemented may have bearing upon the potential 
results of market reforms. 
 
Political Economy Issues 
 
As previously discussed, the policy of privatization emerged in LAC in the midst of, 
arguably, the region’s most acute economic crisis since independence. The scope and 
severity of the crisis afforded an internal mood that favored the adoption of 
privatization programs and weakened resistance by certain domestic socioeconomic 
interest groups (e.g., military, organized labor). External conditions, such as the 
availability of international investors interested in expanding operations into the 
region, foreign aid and multilateral technical assistance, were also encouraging, 
contributing to consolidate the opportunity to initiate the reforms. 
 
Privatization, of course, requires more than just a favorable environment. As Manzetti 
explains, the adoption of this type of reform policy requires the convergence of both 
opportunity and leadership willingness.101 The Chilean privatization process illustrates 
this point. In Chile, the opportunity to embark in economic liberalization and 
privatization presented itself roughly 15 years ahead of other LAC, following the 1973 
military coup. While most firms that has been nationalized between 1970 and 1973 
were returned to their original owners by mid-decade and a significant part of the SOE 
that existed prior to 1970 had been privatized by 1980, the military government did 
not have the will to loose control over the copper, oil exploration and steel industry, as 
well as over the largest electricity and utilities companies, alleging national security 
and strategic reasons (in fact, in 1974 the military actually acquired controlling interest 
                                                 
101 See Manzetti, supra note 100, at 294-296. 
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over the main telephone company).102 It was only until after the 1981-1983 financial 
crisis that the military were persuaded by its team of ideologically motivated policy-
makers to privatize steel, public utilities, the national airline and other large SOE, but 
even then the government refused to sell its interests in copper mining (CODELCO) 
and oil (ENAP) (by 1989, only 19 pre-Allende SOE were still held by the State).103 
 
The willingness to pursue reforms, on the other hand, is often not necessarily 
motivated by ideological conviction. In many cases, leadership willingness is driven 
by pragmatism and self-interested personal or political goals that have the potential to 
directly affect the implementation and results of the policies pursued. For instance, the 
review of contemporary political economy studies on the implementation of 
privatization and other reform policies carried out in Latin America during the 1990s, 
reveals that potential instances of implementation failure (e.g., inadequate contract 
drafting, undervaluation, etc.) are more likely to occur (or, at least, to be perceived to 
have occurred) in the presence of strong centralized leadership fuelled by personal or 
political motivations, or in a context of policymaker-capture by interest groups that 
may result in policy-bias. The Peruvian, Argentine and Mexican experiences, in this 
respect, are most telling.  
 
In hindsight, analysts concur that during his decade in power, Peruvian President 
Alberto Fujimori followed the populist path that has long been a trait of Peruvian 
politics,104 emerging during the 1990s as the personification of political power, 
                                                 
102 See: Ronald Fischer, Rodrigo Gutiérrez and Pablo Serra, The Effects of Privatization on Firms: The Chilean 
Case, in Privatization in Latin America: Myths and Reality 197 (A. Chong and F. López-de-Silanes, eds., 
Stanford University Press, 2005), at 206-213; Judith A. Teichman, The Politics Of Freeing Markets In Latin 
America: Chile, Argentina And Mexico (The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), at 73-76. 
103 See Fischer, Gutiérrez and Serra, supra note 102, at 197-198, 207-211; Teichman, supra note 102, at 77-83. 
104 See, generally, John Crabtree, Neo-Populism and the Fujimori Phenomenon, in Fujimori’s Peru: The Political 
Economy 7 (J. Crabtree and J. Thomas, eds., Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998). 
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reaffirming the Executive Branch’s hegemony over the rest of the State and often using 
the resources at his disposal to build-up his own personal standing with the 
electorate.105 Analysts have observed that the implementation of reform policies under 
Fujimori stemmed from a combination of economic pragmatism and political 
populism (a need to quickly get control over the economic crisis inherited from 
heterodoxy and consolidate personal power), a combination that is crucial for 
understanding institutions that developed and withered under the Fujimori regime.106 
As a result, the privatization program pursued by the Fujimori Administration became 
a means to rapidly attract foreign investment, raise State revenues and diminish the 
power of potential political enemies (namely, the unions).107 Not surprisingly, within 
this environment, it is not unusual to find allegations of inaccurate valuations, lack of 
transparency, inconsistent rules and insufficient oversight in the privatization 
processes implemented,108 or cases in which short-term fiscal revenue motivations 
seem to have been prioritized over long-term efficiency goals pursued by SOE 
divestiture. 
 
                                                 
105 See Crabtree, supra note 104, at 17-19. 
106 At the beginning of the Fujimori administration, Peru’s economy was suffering from stagflation, with a 
monthly inflation rate of around 30% and an official negative GDP growth of 11,6% in 1989. In turn, the new 
government’s legitimacy was weak and fragile, having been elected in part as a result of unprecedented tactical 
voting, lacking a political party to support it and having only a minority in the Congress. [See, generally, 
Crabtree, supra note 104, at 17-19. See, also: Smith, supra note 100, at 158; Manzetti, supra note 100, at 235-236.] 
Thus, from the start, the Fujimori Administration rushed to consolidate and sustain public support by restoring 
both the economic and social order absent during a great part of the previous decade. From this perspective, 
Fujimori’s economic policies, and his embrace of privatization, were not a result of his personal ideological 
preferences, but rather a pragmatic political decision. [See Manzetti, supra note 100, at 246-247.] He had no time 
to spare testing heterodox formulas. Confronted with an urgent need of financial resources, international 
reserves having been depleted by the previous Administration, and quick economic results to booster support, 
the Washington Consensus policy instruments were the natural, if not the only, choice. The increase in social 
spending, designed to make the ‘Fujishock’ politically viable, and the speed with which the policies began to 
yield results, helped ease public unrest. [See: Adolfo Figueroa, Income Distribution and Poverty in Peru, in 
Fujimori’s Peru: The Political Economy 127 (J. Crabtree and J. Thomas, eds., Institute of Latin American Studies, 
1998), at 146-147; Manzetti, supra note 100, at 235.] As hyperinflation was controlled and economic growth 
picked up, so too did Fujimori’s popularity and personal power, a correlation he was well aware of. Thus, as 
long as the economic program adopted showed results, he would be unwilling to tamper with its prescriptions. 
This pacific coexistence between political populism and pragmatic economic liberalism is crucial for 
understanding institutions that developed and withered under the Fujimori regime. 
107 See: Smith, supra note 100, at 158; Manzetti, supra note 100, at 283-288. 
108 See Smith, supra note 100, at 158. 
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The adoption of privatization as a policy instrument in Argentina parallels the 
Peruvian experience in many ways.109 Commentators observe that Menem’s 
implementation of the stabilization and structural reform policies that led to embrace 
privatization, also stemmed from a combination of the need to quickly get control over 
the economic crisis and to consolidate personal standing. In Menem’s case, in addition 
to pursuing the goal of achieving rapid economic results, analysts observe that these 
policy instruments were strategically employed to recast the Peronist Party in his 
image, employing the privatization process as a means to build new alliances with 
domestic capital and conservative leadership, weaken the Peronist union structure and 
consolidate personal power.110 As a result, privatization is said to have been highly 
discretionary and lacking mechanism of accountability, resulting in kickbacks, 
corruption, bid-rigging and leaks of privileged information.111 The harsh hard-line 
perception of privatization under Menem is summarized as follows: “…Menem’s 
program (…) was marked by favoritism, authoritarianism and corruption. Specifically, 
Menem’s haste, coupled with the tilt toward big business (while labor was either coopted or 
repressed), fostered an ethos of executive privilege and cronyism that ultimately undermined 
both the political legitimacy and economic efficiency of the privatization. (…) In effect, the 
conglomerates supplied campaign funds and other kickbacks to Menem and his circle, and the 
president returned the favor by arranging sales of SOEs to these conglomerates on generous 
terms, including low selling prices and large tax breaks”.112  
 
                                                 
109 In 1989, the Menem Adminsitration inherited a similar bankrupt government and an economy suffering from 
stagflation, without a strong popular mandate to pursue economic reform policies. 
110 See: Smith, supra note 100, at 156; Teichman, supra note 102, at 114-118, 127; Manzetti, supra note 100, at 77-
78. 
111 See Teichman, supra note 102, at 116-117; Roberto Saba and Luigi Manzetti, Privatization in Argentina: The 
Implications for Corruption, 25 Crime, Law and Social Change 353 (1996). 
112 Smith, supra note 100, at 156-157. 
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In the Mexican case, while it is not apparent that the government’s privatization 
program was motivated by a need to build alliances, analysts argue that under the 
Salinas Administration (1989-1993), in which 96 percent of all state-owned assets were 
privatized,113 “a small group of powerful entrepreneurs enjoyed easy access to key members of 
the policy core, and close personal relationships developed from these interactions”.114 This 
privileged access to policy-makers is said to have translated into benefits for the 
owners of powerful conglomerates.115 Moreover, the highly discretionary fashion in 
which some Mexican state-owned utilities, highways and banks were privatized, 
contributed to fuel allegations of cronyism and direct benefits to the country’s political 
elite by way of front men.116 
 
In contrast to the experiences outlined above, Brazil’s privatization process under 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso is often cited as a rather exemplary process. Observers 
consider that in Cardoso’s case, the willingness to push forward the privatization 
process stemmed from an ideological commitment to market reforms (a somewhat 
ironic turn of events, since Cardoso had been a fervent defender of ISI policies in his 
youth).117 Cardoso was also largely reputed to be a very skillful politician, who was 
able to push privatization forward though effective communication, dialogue and 
inclusive consensus building with Congress, state governments and interest groups.118 
It is interesting to note that allegations of undervaluation and other implementation 
flaws are often restricted to privatizations implemented by Cardoso’s predecessors.119  
                                                 
113 See Alberto Chong and Florencio López-de-Silanes, Privatization in Mexico, in Privatization in Latin 
America: Myths and Reality 349 (A. Chong and F. López-de-Silanes, eds., Stanford University Press, 2005), at 
354. 
114 Teichman, supra note 102, at 145. 
115 See Teichman, supra note 102, at 146. 
116 See Teichman, supra note 102, at 147. 
117 See Smith, supra note 100, at 157. 
118 See Smith, supra note 100, at 157. 
119 The Brazilian privatization process before Cardoso is somewhat similar to the Peruvian and Argentinean 





Structural reform policies and SOE divestiture entail a profound transformation of the 
State’s role in economic activities -from protagonist to overseer. To be sure, this 
transition is sluggish, costly and technically challenging, for it requires that 
institutionally weak States with systematic failing bureaucracies move from managing 
individual SOE that for decades were run with scarce oversight to supervising and 
regulating entire sectors of industry in unfamiliar competitive environments.120  
 
Few would dispute that making restructured and privatized markets work requires 
implementing sound horizontal regulation (e.g., financial and corporate governance 
regulation) and industry-specific regulation, competition policies, and the 
establishment of clear property rights, as well as parallel institutional reforms. 
Effective and enforceable antitrust legislation, for instance, tends to mitigate the risk of 
market power translating into consumer welfare losses and corporate governance 
regulation facilitates the access to, and the efficient allocation of, capital required to 
finance investments. Absent an effective regulatory framework and capable regulators, 
many of the intended benefits of privatization may go largely unrealized, at least in 
the short-term, particularly in sectors subject to natural monopoly problems or 
                                                                                                                                              
economic crisis inherited from heterodoxy and a divided Congress, executed a swift stabilization program and 
pushed for structural reform and privatization. [See Manzetti, supra note 100, at 151-153.] However, unlike 
Fujimori and Menem, Collor’s actions stirred up a backlash from Congress, labor, university students, and even 
the Catholic Church, fearing that Collor was using the privatizations to build up his political power. [See: Smith, 
supra note 100, at 157; Manzetti, supra note 100, at 153.] After only two years in office, Collor was removed by 
Congress in midst of corruption allegations, being succeeded by Itamar Franco, a caretaker President lacking a 
power base of his own, who slowed down the pace of reforms, being able to execute only a handful of 
privatizations (between the two, only 34 SOE were divested). [See: Smith, supra note 100, at 157; Manzetti, supra 
note 100, at 153-157.] 
120 See William Megginson, Privatization, 118 Foreign Policy 14 (2000), at 22. 
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constrained by limited competition in which efficiency gains from ownership change 
may not be fully achieved.121 
 
Regulation and institutions, however, cannot be put into place overnight. Regulatory 
policy-making effectiveness is conditioned by the industry structure pursued, as well 
as by technical knowledge, abilities and experience that are developed over time 
through training and learning-by-doing. In turn, institution building and the 
development of institutional capacities is largely a result of agency design and 
planning, resourceful leadership and management, check-and-balance controls and 
political backing resulting in effective budgetary, technical and decision-making 
autonomy, factors that, over time, determine institutional consolidation. 
Consequently, successful regulatory drafting and institutional reform are naturally 
long and imperfect processes, a fact that in itself has the potential to delay or limit the 
realization of benefits pursued by divestiture. 
 
Moreover, regulatory and institutional reform may further be hindered as a result of 
the peculiarities of the political environment in which they are implemented. For 
instance, within the context of the political economy under which divestiture was 
implemented in the LAC described above, analysts argue that in Argentina, market 
reforms were not coupled with a clear regulatory framework and effective antitrust 
legislation allowing for possible restrictive practices and abuses of dominant position 
by utilities that were privatized under monopolistic conditions.122 Furthermore, it is 
argued that, in Argentina, the institutional vacuum under which privatizations were 
                                                 
121 See Luigi Manzetti, Political Economy of Regulatory Policy, in Regulatory Policy in Latin America: Post 
Privatization Realities 83 (L. Manzetti, ed., North-South Center Press, 2000).  
122 See, for instance, Roberto Saba, Regulatory Policy in an Unstable Legal Environment: The Case of Argentina, 
in Regulatory Policy in Latin America: Post Privatization Realities 257 (L. Manzetti, ed., North-South Center 
Press, 2000). 
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carried out (e.g., abusing urgency decrees), the political goals pursued by such 
processes (e.g., reward supporters) and the corruption that surrounded their 
implementation, contributed to fostering weak regulatory structures, insufficient 
funding of regulatory institutions and political intervention in the regulators decision-
making processes (in some cases, it was actually a deliberate action to lure 
investors).123 Similar allegations of weak or insufficient oversight have been made in 
regards to the privatizations carried out in most LAC.124 
 
                                                 
123 See Manzetti, supra note 100, at 328. 
124 See: Chong and López-de-Silanes, supra note 91, at 52-55; Manzetti, supra note 100, at 318-321, 328. 
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IV. Globalization and its Discontents: The Pending Agenda 
 
In June of 2002, a massive protest broke-out in Arequipa, Peru’s second largest city, in 
response to the government’s plan to privatize two local state-owned energy-
generating companies (Egasa and Egesur). According to the New York Times, the 
protesters included from “Marxists shouting 60's-era slogans, and hard-bitten unionists 
(…to) Fanny Puntaca, 64, a shopkeeper and grandmother of six”.125 Despite President 
Toledo’s announcement that the privatization would continue regardless of 
opposition, violent and destructive rioting and looting eventually led the government 
to suspend the sale. Just a few weeks later, while anti-globalization campaigners were 
still heralding the result as signaling the death of privatization, the government 
announced it had closed a US$261 million deal, auctioning a 30-year concession right 
to a private consortium to operate the state-owned electricity transmission enterprises 
Etecen and Etesur, also located in Arequipa. The day after the concession was granted, 
labor representatives of the privatized SOE issued a press release announcing that 
they agreed with the concession, stating that their labor rights had been adequately 
protected and asking third parties not to intervene on their behalf or protest against 
the concession. Explaining the somewhat unexpected success of the latter 
privatization, the winning consortium’s counsel acknowledged that his team was 
aware of the need to avoid the problems of the Egasa-Egesur deal and stated the 
following: 
 
“One of the main difficulties of the deal was negotiating with the workers. We had to tell 
people about the benefits that [private operators] will bring, such as a 10 per cent cut in the 
transmission tariff and the interconnection of the supplies of Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, 
which will allow Peru to export energy to the entire Andean community. (…) This is the 
first deal to be announced jointly by government ministers and labour representatives. 
                                                 
125 Juan Forero, Still Poor, Latin Americans Protest Push for Open Markets, New York Times (July 19, 2002), at 
A1.  
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There was no opposition to concession among the workers -in fact they were keen to point 
out its benefits. We believe that if the process is communicated to the workforce, and they 
agree with it, everything runs more smoothly for everybody”.126 
 
The example outlined above reveals that opinion trends against privatization in 
certain quarters of Latin American society are not necessarily rooted in an ownership 
issue, but rather in the political economy and oversight shortcomings previously 
discussed. These shortcomings, however, do not invalidate the theoretical premises 
and empirical evidence upon which privatization of SOE stands. Conversely, they do 
indicate the paramount importance of introducing policies to foster greater 
transparency and political accountability into the divestiture processes and to 
strengthen the regulatory and institutional framework under which privatized firms 
must endure.  
 
Smith and Trebilcock argue that alternative implementation methods, such as 
contracting out and management performance contracts, may be more appropriate in 
the context of institutionally weak democracies battered by unstable political 
environments, corruption and insufficient competition.127 The current movement 
observed in Latin America towards alternative privatization schemes, such as public-
private partnerships, is partially a response to this point of view. Notwithstanding, 
regardless of how we label or package it, any attempt to deepen privatization efforts 
and consolidate its benefits, cannot be conceived and executed in a political vacuum. 
On the contrary, it will necessarily require greater civil community involvement and 
citizen oversight schemes, effective communication, profit-sharing, inclusive dialogue 
and consensus building with labor and other interest groups, issues all to often 
neglected in the region. 
                                                 
126 Peruvian Privatisation Runs Protest Gauntlet, 1 Latin Lawyer Magazine (October/November 2002). 
127 See Smith and Trebilcock, supra note 4, at 238-244. 
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Support for structural reform policies in general, usually follows a “J” curve, initially 
declining and later recovering upon policy maturity.128 If popular support of 
privatization in many LAC is currently at the low point of this curve, retreating at this 
stage would simply be a self-defeating purpose.  
 
* * * 
                                                 
128 See Chong and López-de-Silanes, supra note 91, at 1. 
